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"OH, YOU USE 098, YOU MUST BE FROM HERCEGOVINA?" 
COMMUNICATING IDENTITY IN EVERYDAY CONSUMER RITUALS IN CROATIA 
Katherine Sredl, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
During my preliminary dissertation 
fieldwork in Zagreb and Split, Croatia, in 2002-
2003, I found the debate over Croatian identity 
played out in symbolic consumption very 
interesting. I chose consumption because it is an 
everyday act in which people actively create and 
communicate identity to themselves and to others 
(Douglas and Isherwood 1973). Often, they 
communicate membership to social groups as well 
as status (Solomon 1999). I thought that these 
would be important issues since the post-Yugoslav 
identity, as it was explained to me, is about 
negotiating new identities in a changing political 
climate. I noticed differences in style between 
Hercegovci and other people from Zagreb, and I 
sought understanding, from a local point of view, 
of what this might mean. Informants from Zagreb 
generally organized legitimate Croatians as 
culturally European, and non-Croatians as 
culturally "Balkan." 
Post-socialism offers an opportunity to 
study the social process in which national identity 
is negotiated. The Yugoslav state attempted to 
create a homogenous Yugoslav national identity, 
for example. by glorifYing Yugoslav shared 
peasant heritage (Banac 1999). Political and 
cultural history of the Republics, and even within 
the Republics, trumped efforts to present a 
common peasant heritage at the Yugoslav level. 
Critical discussion of the state did not create, 
across the Republics, a sense of unity through 
protest as might be expected in other movements: 
rock musicians and their audiences understood the 
music as expressing protest from the views of 
Bosnia (New Primitivism), or Slovenia (Laibach) 
but rarely a unified, Yugoslav protest identity 
(Ramet 1999: 126-150). 
Yugoslav project, nevertheless, did create 
a common "other" within Croatia. The question of 
why Croatia had a right to statehood and what the 
borders would be, and who would be excluded, 
remained rather unsatisfactorily answered for 
many Croatians at the start of the first Yugoslavia 
(Banac 1983). After 1945. Tito favored a new 
narrative of unity in which all ethnicities 
contributed to the anti-fascist to suggest ethnic 
assimilation. There was also no formal national 
reconciliation in Croatia after World War II 
(Ramet 1999). Many Croatians, however, 
experienced Yugoslavia as a politically and 
culturally foreign occupying force, which created a 
sense of Croatian unity, or at least distanced it 
from many internal divisions. After Yugoslavia, 
the transformation of political structures redirects 
the construction of Croatian identity and its 
"other." This research asks how these questions of 
identity are addressed in everyday life. 
For many Croatians from Hercegovina, 
secession from SFRY was a chance to reinstate the 
historical, "thousand year old dream of the 
Croatian state," as well as an ethnically 
homogenous Croatian state. For people in Zagreb, 
it was a chance to leave the balkanization that 
came with the influx of peasants into Zagreb, their 
rise in political power, and their "backwards'' 
culture and political processes of Yugoslavia. 
They could return to their European cultural and 
political identity. With the victory of Franjo 
Tudjman, who aligned himself with the 
Hercegovina Croats at home and abroad, the 
historic view of Croatian rights prevailed. Many 
people from Hercegovina migrated to Zagreb; their 
village networks took control of political and 
cultural life, displacing Zagreb natives and 
diminishing their hopes that postsocialism would 
legitimate their political and cultural views. For 
example, Tudjman's argument for annexing 
Hercegovina was that this was not annexation of 
the territory of a neighboring state. but re-
establishment of Croatia's historic borders 
(Hockenos 2003: 17-80; Tanner 1997: 275-289). 
Tudjman censored media criticism of his strategy 
(Udovicki and Ridgeway 1997: 267-280). This 
discourse directed identity into the historical and 
ethnic argument for Croatian statehood and created 
the '·other" as those internal groups who opposed 
it. Zagreb natives became the political and cultural 
"other" in their city, just as migration and political 
transformation were bringing in migrants from 
Hercegovina. How was this tension negotiated in 
daily life? 
Once, at the beginning of the research 
project, as I was searching for a hook to hang these 
observations of contested cultural "Croatianness" 
in the symbolic consumption realm, I happened to 
tell a friend that my phone number was 
098462843. He responded by saying, oh, you are 
for the HDZ, which I took also to mean that I am a 
Hercegovci (I'm not; my family is from Zagreb 
and Slavonia). I decided to research why 098 
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could be a symbol of cultural and inside/outside 
Croatian identity. 
Croatia Telecom (HT), which had been a 
state-held company, completed the privatization 
process in 1999. Under the guidance of 
Hercegovci emigres in Germany, who were tied to 
President Tudjman' s government, Deutsche 
Telecom (DT) purchased a controlling share in 
HT. Moreover, the state included a moratorium on 
accepting bids from other fixed-line providers in 
the privatization terms. For most informants, the 
privatization of HT represented the pillaging of the 
Croatian state's rich resources. They saw the HT 
infrastructure as theirs; during SFRY they paid to 
build state telecom. They anticipated privatization 
would bring them a return on their investment. 
They also anticipated that it would end the state-
socialist monopoly style of services. Instead, they 
understood that Hercegovci emigres close to the 
Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic 
Community, (HDZ) and foreign interests (DT) 
profited at their expense. A small group of elites 
controlled the telecom, creating a situation that did 
not seem too different from state socialism. An 
informant commented, "The war and that period 
when the, uh, HDZ was in the government and all 
of privatization, and all that happened with it was 
horrible" (Silva Zagreb 32). As a consequence, HT 
was unpopular with most Croatians. I recall a 
friend from Dalmatia commenting, "I don't care if 
Slobodan Milosevic owns the next service fixed 
line company in Croatia, I hate HT and I am 
switching when the moratorium is over" (Marie 
Sinj 30). 
At the end of 1999, HT introduced the 
first mobile phone subscription service in Croatia 
under the brand Cronet. Cronet was expensive, and 
most subscribers were Hercegovci. Mobile phone 
service was a way to communicate membership in 
Croatia's new political and economic elite. In the 
eyes of other Croatians, it also communicated 
"balkanness" because of the way many people 
used their phones. In Zagreb, fixed line prefixes 
are related to neighborhoods, so telling an 
acquaintance that your phone number is 4826 032 
is a way to communicate your status of having an 
apartment in the center. meaning you have deep 
local connections and/or money. The Cronet phone 
number prefix, 098, however, communicated 
financial status. It also circumvented and added 
uncertainty to the previously mentioned status 
networks of place and connections. "You would 
tell someone where you lived, and you would lie 
about it and say you lived somewhere better. .. 
Also you would not give your home phone number 
but your mobile number so they would not know" 
(Vera Zagreb advertiser 30). The newcomers used 
their mobile number from Cronet which came to 
be known as a "balkan" brand because of its 
connection to HT and the privatization deal, who 
was using it, and how they were using it. "HDZ 
was ruled by Hercegovci and they were unliked 
but they were really rich and they were on [HT 
mobile]" (Vera). 
In 2000, the symbolic field changed. The 
Croatian government accepted the bid of Austria's 
Vodafone to enter the Croatian market. VIPme and 
its 091 prefix offered consumers an alternative to 
the symbolic associations ofCronet and 098. 
"VIPme [Vodafone] came on market and the 
people didn't like HT so they went to VIP" (Vera). 
With the introduction of 091, purgers (Zagreb 
natives) were able to communicate their identity. 
Just as the 48 prefix on Zagreb land lines stood in 
for connections and/or money, 098 and 09I were 
understood as signifying cultural identity: 098 
stood in for "Balkan" and 091 for European. With 
the changes in technology, consumers had applied 
old meanings to new symbols. They were 
organizing post-socialist changes to national 
identity- the end of the Yugoslav cultural identity 
project and the start of the Croatian project- along 
historic lines of creating a national cohesion, and 
who has the right to belong. 
Hercegovci, ethnic Croatians from 
Hercegovina, were powerful iN Tudjman's 
administration (1990-1999), and in Croatian 
economics, and many migrated to Zagreb from 
Hercegovina or emigre communities abroad after 
1991. Many informants from Zagreb questioned 
the legitimacy Hercegovci power with the 
argument that they were not culturally Croatia. In 
general, this meant they did not speak Croatian 
and their culture was foreign -they spoke a dialect 
different from Zagreb and they were not civilized 
and not European as purgers see themselves, i.e. 
Hercegovci culture was "Balkan". Hercegovci, 
who came from a mountainous borderland with 
Bosnia, viewed themselves as "true Croatians" by 
their historical resistance to the Ottomans and 
Eastern Orthodox political, cultural, and economic 
influence. This looked like historical fanaticism to 
purgers. and as other scholars (Ramet 1999: 166) 
have noted, like Croatians in !stria, who wanted 
nothing to do with this type of"Croatianness". The 
in and out groups were all united on one thing, 
defining Croatian culture and history against the 
East. 
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It seemed to me that people in Croatia, 
especially Zagreb, understood Hercegovci as 
consuming more conspicuously than other groups. 
Women and men Hercegovci are associated with 
BMW cars and the mafia. An informant 
commented, "'Young girls driving BMW at the 
university, things like that, that's usually the 
mafia" (Jagoda, 35 Zagreb). While the BMW is 
usually a sign of status and stability in the US, in 
Croatia, it is a sign of power related to corruption. 
My friends pointed to Hercegovci cafes and 
commented on them as places that the mafia 
frequents. One friend from Zagreb calls them 
kotsku glavi, square heads, because, she says, that 
is how they look. Respondents describe 
Hercegovci as lacking taste, extremely patriotic, 
and behaving as a mafia- a closed society, helping 
only its own, with ethically questionable business 
and political behavior. This tension between 
Hercegovci and purgers in a post-Yugoslav 
climate of negotiating identity was the theme of a 
play I saw, "staje smijesno, banda lopovska" 
"what's so funny, you band of thieves". 
An important aspect of the stories of 
informants from Zagreb is that they react to the 
changing social structure by re-defining their 
status position on cultural grounds of westernness. 
One respondent from Zagreb, who's parents are 
from Zagreb and Ljubljana (Slovenia), described 
the newcomers' pursuit of status goods, "'how do 
they earn their money as they think only about 
how much money they have ... it's totally a 
cultural shock for let's say us [people from 
Zagreb] who were not taught that way ... people 
who come now from that part of Croatia 
[Hercegovina] ... the values are totally, I mean, 
wrong and they did not stand on healthy teet so 
you can feel it on the street" (Marija 29 Zagreb). 
Creating a homogenous Croatian 
ethnicity in Croatia is a difficult project, since 
most informants refer to Italian, Hungarian, or 
Montenegrin grandparents. The literature tends to 
center on the question of the civil and cultural 
rights that the Croatian state ensures for ethnic 
minorities (i.e. Serbs living in Croatia). Certainly, 
minority rights are an important issue for 
European states with particular political challenges 
for post-socialist states emerging from 
authoritarian national ideology. In my research, 
however, I felt that for most informants, the first 
national project was a cohesive Croatian ethnic, 
historic, political, and cultural identity. One 
reason, I believe, is that the Yugoslav political 
climate did not allow for a negotiation of this 
question. I also believe that another issue is that 
ethnic identity is a complex process everywhere, 
especially in Croatia, a borderland, where most 
informants are ethnically mixed. Focusing on 
ethnic identity makes very few people a legitimate 
Croatian. For people from Zagreb, focusing on 
cultural identity ensures their power. For 
Hercegovci, historical identity makes sense 
because it points to a distinct period in which they 
were part of a Croatian nation. 
I believe my findings support scholarly 
notions ofOrientalisms and nestling Orientalisms 
(Bakic- Hayden and Hayden, Todorova 1997). 
Taking the question out of Serb/Croat context 
pointed to me the importance of defining 
"Croatian-ness" and how these are related to ideas 
of the state's legitimacy. Moreover, most 
informants disclosed that one parent or 
grandparent was from another former Yugoslav 
Republic, but they identified themselves as 
Croatian. I felt that this informed an open 
discussion of the problems of definitions of 
ethnicity, because most people cannot claim to be 
ethnically "pure" Croatians. Also, the country's 
regions share different cultural and historical 
influences. It felt as if the country was in a period 
of negotiating who. if anyone was a Croatian. I 
recall an advertiser commenting, "'We can't use 
comedy in our ads, making fun of ourselves, 
because it is too sensitive still. We don't know 
who we are to make fun of ourselves" (Luka, 
Zagreb 30). I think the question of national 
identity is first to be dealt with between Croatians. 
Once that is handled. dealing with ethnic 
minorities can be perceived as non-threatening to 
Croatian identity. 
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